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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE UNDER
THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
ACT OF COLORADO

TO

By Otto Friedrichsof the Denver Bar

the average practicing lawyer in this state, procedure

under the Workmen's Compensation Act is rather vague
and hazy; he has some general ideas upon the subject
which may or may not be correct. When he is consulted by
his client and attempts to look up the law, he learns little unless a close study is made of our decisions interpreting the Act,
and if he has occasion to appeal to the couris from a decision
of the Commission, he is very likely to omit some of the essential steps necessary to be taken before our courts will have
jurisdiction. He is apt to reason from common law principles
and find, too late, that the principles do not apply, for the
ideas worked out by the various Workmen's Compensation
Acts are foreign to the common law and depend entirely upon
statutes.
Workmen's Compensation Acts were originally passed
in response to the public demand for a system whereby the
employers and employes might escape from personal injury
litigation and to afford to injured workmen an inexpensive
and speedy method of obtaining some compensation when injured in the course of their employment, irrespective of negligence or assumption of risk by the injured workman. The
uncertainty of an action at law is thereby obviated and the
compensation received by the injured workman is standardized.
Courts have been almost unanimous in according to such
acts a broad and liberal construction in order to effectuate
their evident intent and purpose, and our own Supreme Court,
in a very late case, has said:
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"The Workmen's Compensation Act is highly
remedial, beneficent in purpose, and should be given
a liberal construction, so as to accomplish the evident
intent and purpose of the act. Karely v. Industrial
Commission, 65 Colo. 239, 243. In Corpus Juris,
title "Workmen's Compensation Acts", sec. 24, it is
said that the courts have been practically unanimous
in so construing such statutes. In the case of In re
Petrie, 215 N. Y. 335, the court said:
" 'The statute was the expression of what was regarded by the legislature as a wise public policy concerning injured employes. Under such circumstances, we think that it is to be interpreted with fair
liberality, to the end of securing the benefits which
it was intended to accomplish.' "-CentralSurety &
Ins. Corp. vs. Ind. Comm. 271 Pac.With this in mind, we shall now consider some of the
provisions of our law.
Our Act defines the persons who are included within its
scope, and all of the following are employers:
(a) The State, and each county, city, town, irrigation,
drainage and school district thereof, and all public institutions and administrative boards thereof. These public employers are made subject to the Act irrespective of the number of persons they employ.
(b) Private employers who employ four or more persons
engaged in the same business or employment. Employers of
domestic servants or farm and ranch labor, and employers of
less than four persons in the same business, are expressly excepted from the operation of the Act, but they may elect to
become subject thereto by filing a statement to that effect with
the Industrial Commission. Common carriers engaged in
interstate commerce and their employes do not come under
the Act.
Private employers may withdraw from the provisions of
the Act if they so desire, by giving notice to the Industrial
Commission and by posting notices in their places of employment. Unless such election is made pursuant to statute, employers are conclusively presumed to have accepted the provisions of the Act.
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(c) We have also two classes of constructive employers
created purely by statute, the first of which includes persons
or corporations operating or engaged in conducting any business by leasing or contracting out any part or all of the work
to any lessee, sub-lessee, contractor or sub-contractor. Such
persons are considered to be employers and are subject to the
Act irrespective of the number of employes engaged in the
work. The second class of constructive employers includes
every person, company or corporation that owns property or
improvements thereon and that contracts out any work done
on said property to any contractor, sub-contractor or other
person who shall hire or use four or more workmen (including himself if working on the job).
Employes coming within the definitions in the Act may
be roughly classed as persons in the service of employers who
are within the scope of the Act, but not including any persons
whose employment is but casual and not in the usual course
of trade, business, profession or occupation of his employer.
An employe may also elect not to come under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act by giving notice
to his employer and the Industrial Commission to that effect.
Unless such notice is given, employes of persons subject to the
provisions of the Act who have complied with its requirements, including insurance, are conclusively presumed to have
accepted the provisions of the Act.
Election and compliance with the Workmen's Compensation Act are considered to be a surrender by the employer
and employe of their rights to any other method or amount
of compensation or determination thereof, and to any cause
of action at law or in equity or any remedy or proceeding
whatever on account of personal injuries or death.
One of the most radical changes made in the old system
by the Workmen's Compensation Act is the abrogation of defenses which under the common law could be urged by employers. In an action against an employer for personal injuries or death of an employe, assumption of risk, want of
care of a fellow servant and contributory negligence of the
injured employe, where such negligence was not willful, are
no longer a defense, unless the employer has complied with
the provisions of the Act (including the insurance provisions)
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and the action is brought for personal injuries or death sustained by an employe who has elected not to come under the
Act.
After determining that the employer comes within the
provisions of the Act and that he does not wish to withdraw
therefrom, the next provision affecting him is compulsory
insurance for the benefit of his employes. The Act provides
that the employer shall secure compensation for his employes
in one of the following ways: (a) by insuring with the State
Compensation Insurance Fund, (b) by insuring with an insurance corporation authorized to write workmen's compensation insurance in this State, or (c) self-insurance. The latter is a method used by employers of a large number of men
and, as the term implies, it makes the employer his own insurance carrier. The State Compensation Insurance Fund is
in practical effect an insurance company created by statute
and operated at cost by the State under the control of the Industrial Commission. Public employers are required to insure with the State Fund; private employers may or may not
insure therein at their option. All workmen's compensation
policies must contain, among other things, a clause to the
effect that the insurance carrier shall be directly and primarily
liable for any compensation for which the employer is liable.
Where the employer comes within the provisions of the
Act, and has failed to insure or keep insured his liability, the
employe or his dependents may nevertheless claim compensation, and in such case our statutes provide that the amount
of compensation shall be increased fifty per cent. and the Commission must determine the present value of the unpaid compensation benefits, computed at the rate of four per cent. per
annum. The employer must then deposit such amount with
a trustee designated by the Commission, or file a surety company bond or a bond signed by two or more responsible sureties to be approved by the Commission, to guarantee the payment of the benefits. Where the employer fails to do this, a
certified copy of the Commission's award may be filed with
the Clerk of any District Court in the State and the Commission's award then has all the effect of a judgment of the District Court.
Let us assume that the employer has taken out insurance

DICTA

and a workman is injured. Unless the employer or some person in charge shall have actual notice of the injury, the workman is required to notify the employer within two days of the
injury. If he fails so to do, he loses one day's compensation
for each day's failure to report. The injured workman is
relieved from giving notice where someone reports the accident for him.
The employer then makes a report of the accident upon
a blank provided for his use by the insurance carrier or the
Commission, giving the details of the accident, etc. This report must be filed with the Industrial Commission within ten
days after the accident. The injured workman also files a
notice of claim for compensation if he claims any; notice is
in writing upon the forms prescribed by the Commission and
the notice is served upon the Commission in duplicate. The
Commission then mails one copy to the employer or insurance
carrier.
The right to compensation benefits is barred unless such
notice is filed with the Commission within six months after
the injury or within one year after death results therefrom.
This statute does not apply where the workman has received
some compensation for his injury within the six month period
before his claim is filed, and it has been held that the employer or insurance carrier may under certain circumstances
be estopped to set up this defense.
If the insurance carrier intends to contest the claim for
compensation, a notice to that effect, setting forth the grounds
of contest, must be filed with the Commission within fifteen
days after the injury. This time may be extended by the Commission for cause, not exceeding ten days at a time. If such
notice of contest is not filed, the Industrial Commission has
adopted a rule (pursuant to the statute giving the Commission
power to make reasonable and proper rules and regulations
relative to the exercise of its powers and to govern its proceedings, etc.) that the employer and insurance carrier will not
be permitted to introduce any evidence at the hearing held
pursuant to the claim for compensation.
If the employer or insurance carrier admits liability, his
admission specifies the amount and how payable, and the pe-
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riod and disability for which compensation will be paid, and
payments are made on account as due.
After the reports have been filed with the Commission,
the claim is set for hearing, usually before a referee. Notice
is given to all parties interested at least ten days before the
hearing. These parties have a right to be present in person,
by an attorney or any other agent and may introduce evidence
as may be pertinent, and also have the right to cross-examine.
The burden of proving the right to compensation is upon
the claimant, but the procedure is not technical and the legal
rules of evidence are not strictly followed. The witnesses are
sworn and hearsay testimony is ordinarily admitted if it throws
a'ny light on the matters in dispute. In addition to the sworn
testimony, reports of physicians, reports of investigators of the
Commission, reports of employers, books and other records,
hospital records, etc., are admitted. Ex parte evidence may
also be taken by the Commission. This evidence is reduced
to writing and an opportunity is given to the parties in interest
to inspect it and then, if they wish, another hearing is had and
the parties may introduce evidence in rebuttal, or may crossexamine the witnesses so examined in their absence.
It must not be assumed from this informal procedure,
however, that a claimant can establish his right to compensation without evidence which would be competent according
to the rules established by law, for our Supreme Court has
said that there must be some legal and competent evidence to
sustain the claim, otherwise it must be denied. The impression is not infrequent that a workman who is injured is entitled
to compensation irrespective of how he was injured or what
he was doing when so injured which, if correct, would make
workman compensation merely a health, accident, and life insurance scheme. Such is not the case, however, for in order
to entitle a workman or his dependents to compensation, there
must have been an accident, and at the time of the accident
the employe must have been performing a service arising out
of and in the course of his employment, and the injury or
death must have been proximately caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment and not intentionally inflicted. Thus, if a man is killed or injured while
doing something not in the course of his employment (as going

DICTA

outside his employment to do something for himself) or if
the accident does not arise out of his employment (as an injury
due to some common hazard not increased by his work) or if
there is no accident (such as contracting an occupational disease) no compensation is payable. From this, it will be seen
that after showing the claimant's employment, evidence must
be introduced at the outset to establish (1) that he was injured in an accident, (2) arising out of, and (3) in the course
of his employment.
Having thus shown the right to some compensation, the
quantum thereof must also be established. The evidence
should show what medical, surgical, nursing and hospital
treatments were rendered to the injured workman and what
hospital supplies, etc., were furnished to him, during the first
sixty days from the date of the accident as a result of his injuries. This is compensable to the extent of $200. If the injury results in death, the sum of $125 is also allowed as funeral expenses.
The benefits to which the claimant is entitled must be
proved. In injury cases the time when the workman left work
and the time when he was able to return to work must be shown
so that the period of his disability may be computed. For the
first ten days the workman receives nothing but his expenses
mentioned in the last paragraph. Starting with the eleventh
day, he is entitled to 50% of his average weekly wages, so
long as his disability is total, not to exceed $12 per week and
not less than $5 per week unless the workman's average weekly
wages are less than $5, in which event he is entitled to compensation equal to his average weekly wages. If the disability is only partial the employe receives 50% of the impairment of his earning capacity, not exceeding $12 per week or
an aggregate of $1560. These benefits are what is known as
"temporary" disability, which ordinarily means the healing
or convalescing period.
The "average weekly wages" upon which compensation
is ordinarily based are usually computed by taking the total
amount earned by the injured or killed employe in the six
months preceding the accident, and dividing that sum by
twenty-six. There are times when this method is obviously
unjust, as where the workman has not worked for a good part
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of the six month period preceding the accident, or has been
in business for himself, or where for some other reason this
method does not fairly represent the workman's average weekly wages. In such event, the Industrial Commission has power
to use such other method as will, in its opinion, and based
upon facts, fairly determine such average weekly wage.
When the injury becomes fixed, i.e., when the healing
stops and there is still a disability which will remain permanent, the disability is known as "permanent" and additional
compensation is payable for that. If the disability is permanent and total, this should be proved; if permanent and partial, the extent of the partial disability should be established
in terms of percentage. The statute contains a schedule of
compensation to be paid to employes for permanent disability
on a weekly basis, and when the disability is proved, the Referee or Commission computes the amount of compensation
due to the claimant.
In claims for death, only persons who were dependents
at the date of the accident are entitled to compensation. A
wife living with her husband, and minor children under the
age of eighteen years are conclusively presumed to be wholly
dependent. Other claimants must prove that they were dependent and the extent of such dependency. Partial dependents are entitled to receive only that percentage of the benefits
provided for those wholly dependent which the average
amount of the wages regularly contributed by the deceased
bore to the total income of the dependents. Thus, it will be
seen, even though a workman had relatives living at the time
of his death, unless they were dependent upon him for support, no compensation is payable.
When the claimant has presented his evidence and made
a prima facie case, the employer and insurance carrier also
have the right to introduce evidence to contest the claim in
its entirety or to reduce the amount by showing that the injury
was caused by the willful failure of the employe to use safety
devices provided by the employer, or the willful failure to
obey a reasonable safety rule adopted by the employer, or that
the injury resulted from the intoxication of the employe. The
hearings are sometimes shortened by certain admissions, such
As admissions by the insurance carrier that the injured man
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was an employe and that he was injured in an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, and the like.
In such cases, it is only necessary to prove the remaining facts
in dispute.
After both sides have presented their case, the referee
makes a finding of fact and enters an order upon such finding,
either denying or awarding compensation and fixing the
amount thereof. Any party in interest dissatisfied with such
award has ten days after notice of the order (unless further
time is granted) within which to file a petition for review,
which is similar to a motion for a new trial in an action at
law. The petition must be in writing and specify in detail the
errors assigned. Unless such petition for review is filed, the
referee's award is the final award of the Commission and may
not be reopened by any of the parties.
The referee has the power to re-open the case and amend
or modify his order, and from such amended or modified order dissatisfied parties must again file their petitions for review within the ten days as in the first instance. If the referee
does not amend or modify his order upon the filing of a
petition for review, the case is referred to the Industrial Commission, which reviews the entire record and may take additional testimony. The Commission then makes findings and
enters an order thereon as did the referee. This order is then
the final order unless a petition for review is filed within the
ten days after notice thereof allowed by statute or the additional time allowed by the Commission. Where a petition
for review is filed, the Commission again reviews the record
and files and enters what it terms a "supplemental award"
eitlier changing the former order or denying the petition. It
is essential that petitions for review be filed to both the orders
of the referee and of the Industrial Commission, in order to
vest the courts with jurisdiction to review the action of the
Commission. This step is one which is very often overlooked
by attorneys unfamiliar with the practice.
Perhaps at some stage of the proceedings the claimant
decides to employ an attorney. Here is where the attorney
sometimes fails to protect himself, to his subsequent chagrin.
The act provides that no lien shall be allowed and no contract
is enforceable for attorneys' fees rendered in these cases un-
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less previously authorized by the Commission. The Commission's rules provide that no fee will be allowed unless the
attorney makes application for such allowance prior to or
during the hearing of any claim or during the pendency of
litigation.
We shall assume now that a final order has been entered
by the Commission denying the petition for review and one
of the parties is dissatisfied. Within twenty days after the
final order of the Commission, denying review, an action must
be commenced in the District Court in the County wherein
the injury was sustained or in the District Court of Denver.
The Commission and the adverse parties must be made defendants. If the Commission awarded compensation to the
claimant and the employer brings the action, compensation
must be paid weekly to the claimant while the action is pending in court for our Supreme Court has said:
"It is to be noted in this connection that the judgment of the commission in favor of a claimant is
prima facie evidence of his right to recover. Procedure under the act is summary in character in order
to furnish immediate aid to injured employees, and
a careful reading of the statute as a whole leads to
the conclusion that it was the intention of the Legislature that payment of these weekly allowances
should not be stayed. Indeed, to hold that such payments can be enjoined pending judicial review would
in effect practically nullify one of the prime objects
and purposes of the law."-Employers' Co. v. Industrial Com., 65 Colo. 288.
This rule has worked an injustice in several instances to
the writer's knowledge, and the Supreme Court has lately
ordered a stay of payments pending a review by that Court
where there was a bona fide dispute as to the employer's liability and a showing was made that if the payments were continued and the Commission's order was later reversed, there
would be no way to recover from the employe. It is doubtful, however, whether the District Court has power to make
such order.
It is necessary that a copy of the complaint be served with
the summons and that the complaint shall state the grounds
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upon which a review of the Commission's award is sought.
There must also be an allegation that the petition for review
was filed with the Commission within the time allowed.
Within twenty days after service of the complaint, the
Commission certifies its entire file, including a transcript of
the testimony taken before it, to the District Court and this
constitutes an answer and judgment roll of the Commission.
The case is then ready for trial.
The trials of Industrial Commission cases are upon the
record and no additional evidence is taken. They consist of
oral arguments upon questions of law only; the findings of the
Commission upon disputed facts are analogous to the verdict
of a jury and will not be disturbed if there is any credible
evidence to sustain them.
There are three grounds for setting aside an award of the
Commission: (1) Where the Commission acted without authority or in excess of its powers, as where it has made its findings and award and there is no evidence in support thereof;
(2) where the finding, order, or award was procured by fraud;
or (3) where the findings of fact do not support the order or
award; as, for example, if the findings should show that the
workman's average weekly wages were $5, but an award is
made for more than that sum.
The Court has no power to pass upon the admission or
rejection of evidence before the Commission and must disregard any irregularity on error of the Commission unless it is
made affirmatively to appear that the party complaining thereof was damaged thereby. As stated before, however, there
must be some legal evidence to sustain an award of compensation.
After argument, the District Court may affirm the award
of the Commission or may set it aside and remand the record
to the Commission for further hearing or proceeding, or it
may order the Commission to enter the proper award upon
the findings. Within twenty days thereafter, the record is
transmitted to the Commission unless in the meantime a writ
of error is obtained from the Supreme Court. The District
Court has no power to extend this time and even if it should
attempt so to do such order is of no effect.-(General Chemical Co. v. Thomas, 71 Colo. 28.)
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The judgment of the District Court may be reviewed by
the Supreme Court on a writ of error as in other cases, but
the procedure is slightly different. The writ of error must be
obtained within twenty days; assignments of error and the
record are filed as usual, but no bill of exceptions is necessary.
Briefs in Industrial Commission cases are not required to be
printed; they may be typewritten and only ten copies are filed
with the Court. Within fifteen days after the issuance of the
writ of error, the plaintiff in error must file his brief; within
ten days the defendant in error must file his brief; and five
days thereafter are allowed for filing the reply brief. For
good cause shown, an extension of time for filing briefs is
sometimes granted as in other cases. No abstract of record
and no bond are required.
The foregoing will give a general idea of our Workmen's
Compensation Act and the manner in which a simple claim
is handled when no collateral issues crop up in the case, as they
sometimes do. Many questions which might arise and other
matters covered by the statute cannot, of course, be discussed
in the space permitted here. But if this article proves to be
of some benefit to those lawyers who are unfamiliar with the
Act or causes them to avoid some of the pitfalls in the procedure thereunder, its purpose will be accomplished.

SOME COMMENTS ON THE LAWYER
IN COURT
By Judge Charles C. Sackmann of the District Court
of the Second JudicialDistrict
ITTING upon a slightly elevated position upon the
bench, with a broad birds-eye view of the court room
and all its contents, I am asked to give my views out of
an experience of four years with the attorneys who appear
before the courts, as to their general conduct and attitude
toward the court and their aptitude in handling their clients'
business.
All courts, of course, must observe the look of utter astonishment that comes across the face of counsel at times because of the utter absurdity of the court's position in the mind
of that counsel to whom the decision is adverse; the pained
surprise and plain sympathy for the judge, from those who
realize at certain stages of the argument that the court is just
incapable of digesting and assimilating the profound argument being presented, sometimes for the first time known to
man.
But, jesting aside, all courts, I am sure, love and appreciate the fine broad fraternalism and comradeship of the.bar
and the fine gentlemanly courtesy that comes from the lawyers at the bar to the court.
Arising, I am sure, from that fundamental, ingrown respect that every good American citizen has for the courts of
our country, one immediately feels upon being elevated to the
bench that atmosphere of respect, courtesy and desire to do
honor to the judge, exuding not only from the lay citizenship
but even more so from the members of the bar practicing before the court.
A finer, more gentlemanly, more scholarly, more humane,
more lovable body of men than are found in the bar of America can be found in no other profession.
By no more impressive means can a judge be made to feel
the responsibility and honor of his position than by the eagerness with which the younger practitioner in the courts waits
upon his advice and explanation of his decisions. With the
enthusiasm of youth, of ttimes disagreeing with the conserva-
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tive attitude of the court, but, nevertheless, respectful of its
decisions, eager to have its own viewpoint recognized and affirmed, but seldom sulky if such results are not obtained.
One finds a little unintentional forgetfulness sometimes
as to the ethics of trying to discuss with the court, in the absence of counsel for the other side, some point that must later
be decided by the court, but never, I am sure, with the deliberate intention of taking any undue advantage of the other
side or imposing on the court.
In fact, I have found the finest sort of cooperation on the
part of the bar in overlooking mistakes of judgment on the
part of the court, and a whole-hearted attitude on the part of
lawyers to blame the mistakes of the judge upon his lack of
brains rather than to any ulterior or unscrupulous motives,
which is, of course, always appreciated by any judge. The
greatest compliment that can be paid to any judge by the bar
is a sincere belief in his integrity-respect for his ability, if
any, being a secondary consideration.
In the unbiased criticism of the handling by the lawyers
before the courts of their cases much may be said.
Of some it may be said that the court is made to wonder
what possibly could have called the attorney to the bar as a
profession, there seeming to be such an utter lack of any of
the usually looked for attributes that make for the successful
lawyer. This class-a small one, to be sure-inflict on the
court the greatest punishment of any, raising questions that
have never before been heard of and on which there are no
decisions of the higher courts because of their very absurdity.
Then there is the bright, self-sufficient lawyer who, having worked on his case for a month and having it at his finger
tips, proceeds on the basis that every one else is as well informed, the court included, presents his points with a short
snappy statement that presupposes a full grasp of the entire
situation on the part of the court, which is usually a violent
presumption, and leaves the court entirely in the dark as to
"how, when and where". To these, I plead, be patient with
the court; he probably does not think as fast as you do; present
your point simply in words of one syllable, as to a child, and
the court, no doubt, in time will come to your viewpoint.
Then there is the attorney who, taking it for granted that
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the court has a poor memory, reads from a Colorado case that
portion which fits his argument, forgetting to read the next
line or paragraph which does not. Attorneys should be especially careful as to this, as it might mislead the court, and,
of course, no lawyer would desire to do that as the courts make
mistakes enough without any undue assistance to that end.
Also there is the attorney who stands upon the broad principles of the law, with no particular application to the question to be decided, and presumes the court to be possessed of
divine attributes that will assist him in making his decision
without authority or precedent. This is also a violent presumption as many judges are not good church members and
it is very doubtful if they receive any divine assistance or know
how to ask for it.
Again there is the attorney who really prepares his case,
who has learned that the successful lawyer must work day and
night, who presents his facts and his legal arguments like a
general marshaling his forces, who makes even a sleepy judge
sit up and take notice and leads him to a correct decision of
the point involved because of the masterly manner in which
the argument for it is prepared and presented and backed up
by research and authority.
Then there is the attorney who has heard at some time
about rules of the court, but has never seen a copy or really
believed that any existed, and is really rather hurt when the
court calls the same to his attention and enforces them. There
really are printed rules of the District Court, which may be
obtained for the asking; they were prepared by the judges en
banc after considerable thought, and are considered of some
importance by the court.
If I were to make any criticism of the handling of cases
in court by attorneys, I would say: be sure that you are a court
lawyer to start with; become familiar with the rules of court;
have a fair knowledge of the provisions of the Code; prepare
your argument and back it up with good precedent, or at least
logic; then present it on the hypothesis that the court knows
nothing about the point, simply and in apt language, and the
court will be apt to follow you and decide correctly.

THE DECEMBER MEETING
AND DEBATE
HE monthly meeting for December was held December 3, Mr. Shattuck presiding in the absence of Mr.
Toll. Those members who attended were entertained by
a spirited debate between Mr. Wayne C. Williams (for the
Affirmative) and Mr. James H. Pershing (for the Negative)
upon the subject: "Resolved: That Congress Should Enact a
Law Limiting the Power of the Federal Courts in the Use of
Injunctions in Suits Involving Labor Disputes."
It had been the intention of the speakers to debate the
Shipstead Bill, which, unfortunately, perhaps, for the clarity
of the issue, had been withdrawn upon the very day of the
meeting. Mr. Williams in opening said the debate reminded
him of the occasion when William Penn, sailing back to England, in a severe attack of nostalgia began to whistle "Home
Sweet Home". Suddenly, Penn remembered that the tune
had not yet been written, so he was forced to stop.
Each speaker was allowed fifteen minutes for his opening argument, seven minutes for rebuttal, and Mr. Williams
three minutes in which to close. We present a resume of the
arguments in the order of their presentation.
Mr. Williams: The Federal courts should be further
limited in issuing injunctions in labor disputes. No injunction was issued in this country prior to 1848. In earlier years
in England it had been a statutory crime for laborers to form
unions or to strike for higher wages. But in this country a
broader view was adopted in the first instance, and unions and
strikes were declared legal. The leading cases in the United
States are: In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, in which it was held
that a strike leader who obstructed the mails and interstate
commerce might be imprisoned; Loewe vs. Lawlor (Danbury
Hatters' case), 208 U. S. 274 and 235 U. S. 522; and Gompers
vs. Bucks Stove Co., 221 U. S. 418, cases arising upon alleged
violations of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, which never contemplated labor strikes as restraints upon commerce; Hitchman Coal Co. vs. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229; Truax vs. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, in which Chief Justice Taft agreed that
violent picketing could be restrained, but not peaceful picket-
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ing; United Leather Workers Union vs. Herbert, 265 U. S.
457; and Bedford Stone Co. vs. Journeymen Stone Cutters'
Assn., 273 U. S. 677.
In 1914 Labor demanded an Act to give relief from injunctions. The Clayton Act was supposed to grant this relief
by prohibiting injunctions in labor disputes "unless necessary
to prevent irreparable injury to property, or to a property
right * * * for which injury there is no adequate remedy at
law". By the Bedford Stone Co. case and other cases, this Act
has been whittled away, so that a further Act controlling interpretation of the Clayton Act has become necessary.
In 1920 the Federal District Court in United Leather
Workers vs. Herkert enjoined illegal picketing as a violation
of the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court through Chief Justice Taft held that the acts complained of were not a restraint
upon interstate commerce, and overruled the lower Court.
Yet for four years and two months the injunction had been in
force, and had illegally hindered the strikers. George Wharton Pepper declared in a recent speech that three hundred injunctions had been issued in the Railway Shopmen's strike,
and not a single one refused. The acts forbidden in this strike
included paying out strike funds, meeting upon church property to discuss the strike, asking others to strike, singing songs,
singing hymns.
The right to enjoin violence and destruction is undeniable, but rights of free speech continue, and include the right
to persuade others not to serve as "scabs". Appeals from injunctions should be more speedily determined. The right to
meet and to speak peaceably, the right of peaceful picketing,
and of paying out strike money, should be protected according
to the Act, and a jury should be required in labor cases to prevent liberty being lost without due process.
Mr. Pershing: The cases already determined put insuperable obstacles in the way of limiting equity powers of
the Federal courts by legislation without a Constitutional
amendment.
. Two other bills introduced prior to the Shipstead Bill
were abandoned because this fact was recognized by the party
offering the bill. The Shipstead Bill was an attempt to amend
Chapter 2 of the judiciary rules; namely, the rule that equity
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courts shall have equity powers where there is no remedy at
law. The Bill attempts to have property defined by the word
"tangible".
Knowing that the Bill was unconstitutional, Shipstead
withdrew it and substituted another. But underlying all of
these bills is an attempt to define property and to hold that the
right to work for another is not a property right. They urge
two propositions: first, that the right to employ and to be employed is not property; second, that there is no equity power
in the Federal courts to determine labor disputes. The real
issue is therefore, "Has Congress the right to tell the courts
how to decide labor disputes", and also "Shall this right be
asserted because equity powers have been abused by some of
the courts".
Even if these powers have been abused, which I don't
admit, the Constitution was written to establish justice. The
courts are the proper agencies for this purpose. Article III,
Section 1, declares that the judicial powers shall be vested in
the courts. The extent of these powers is that which existed
in the English court of Chancery at the time of the Revolution.
The United States Supreme Court held in Pennsylvania vs.
Wheeling Bridge Co., 13 How. 518, that original equity jurisdiction was conferred upon it by the Constitution, and in
United States vs. Klein, 13 Wall. 128, that Congress cannot
limit this power by legislation.
The Constitution gives the Supreme Court original jurisdiction and gives Congress the power to limit the jurisdiction
of the lower courts. But under the color of this right, Congress cannot trespass upon the judicial power. This would
be a violation of the Fifth Amendment.
Therefore, Congress by legislation cannot declare that
what has been held property is not property. And this is true
in cases involving the right to employ or to be employed, see
Adair vs. United States 208 U. S. 161, Coppage vs. Kansas,
236 U. S. 1.
Mr. Williams: If constitutionality is the issue, I am
willing to debate it. But it is not the question. The issue is
one of fundamental policy: of the right of the courts under
equity powers to deprive individuals of their liberty. There
has been great abuse; six hundred injunctions were issued last
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year. The jurisdiction of the District and Circuit Courts may
be limited by Congress, and it is in those courts that the abuse
exists. The fact is Mr. Pershing stands for property and I
stand for liberty. Liberty can't be restrained.
By the Clayton Act Congress has said no injunction shall
issue in labor disputes, unless there is no adequate legal remedy. In American Steel Foundries vs. Tri-City Council, 257
U. S. 201, 208, Chief Justice Taft held that Congress might
by legislation restrict the jurisdiction of the courts. Mr. Pershing's quarrel is therefore with Chief Justice Taft and the
Supreme Court, not with me. The court there held that unions may persuade others to strike; that a single employee is
helpless, and that unions are necessary to cope with the big
employer. If this decision is right, no court may restrain these
things; and if this is true, Congress may pass a bill to that
effect. The lower courts are restraining these things, however. Abuse exists and if Mr. Pershing doesn't like their prohibition by legislation, it is for him to suggest a remedy.
Mr. Pershing: If such a bill is unconstitutional, it is
against policy to adopt it. Every bill upon the subject has
been thrown out for that reason. I don't say that legislation
might not be proposed which is constitutional. The Constitution imposes upon the Supreme Court and such lower courts
as Congress has created judicial power. This power, once
acquired, can't be destroyed by Congress. Mr. Williams refers to a case in which Taft has declared certain acts legal.
But suppose Congress had said that Taft couldn't declare
them legal or illegal.
Mr. Williams says I am for property and he is for liberty.
But such legislation would destroy both property and liberty.
In Adair vs. United States the decision was upon the constitutionality of an Act prohibiting employers from discharging
employees under certain conditions. It was held the Act violated rights of liberty and property. So also in Coppage vs.
Kansas. Suppose there are abuses of the equity powers; it
isn't necessary to burn down the house to correct them.
Mr. Williams: I don't want the liberties of a man restricted by an ex parte injunction of which he knows nothing
until he goes to jail. I have no quarrel with Mr. Pershing
over the definition of property. He says Congress can't limit
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equity jurisdiction. Then the Clayton Act is unconstitutional
and the Supreme Court wrong. Under the Adair case and
the Coppage case no court can prevent a laborer from leaving
his employment, though his employer is thereby ruined. Yet
it has been done by injunction. The courts are not greater
than the Constitution. The Adair and Coppage cases relate
to statutes prohibiting employers from discharging men because of their union affiliations. They aren't concerned with
injunctions.
Mr. Pershing then asked Mr. Williams, "Granting the
rights involved are rights of liberty, not property, who is to
determine them, Congress or the courts"? To this Mr. Williams answered, "Primarily, Congress is to determine them".
Editor's Note.-The Clayton Act, Act of October 15, 1914, c. 323, secs.
6, 20, contains the following language:
"Sec. 6. The labor -of a human being is not a commodity or article of
commerce. Nothing contained in the anti-trust laws shall be construed to
forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help, and not having capital
stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members of
such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof;
nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof be held or construed to
be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.
"Sec. 20. No restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any
court of the United States, or a judge or the judges thereof, in any case between an employer and employees, * * * or between persons employed and
persons seeking employment, involving or growing out of, a dispute concerning
terms or conditions of employment, unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property, or to a property right, of the party making the application,
for which injury there is no adequate remedy at law, * * *."

COLORADO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(EDITORs NoTE.-It is intended in each issue of the DimrA to print brief abstracts
of the decisions of the Supreme Court. These abstracts will be printed only after the
time within which a petition for rehearing may be filed has elapsed without such action being taken, or in the event that a petition for rehearing has been filed the abstract
will be printed only after the petition has been disposed of.)

No. 12,046. Gaskins vs. State of Colorado.-DecidedNov. 26, 1928.
Facts.-Gaskinsowned an interest in realty, on which the
other owner and the tenant maintained a nuisance. The other
owner and the tenant were served with process, but Gaskins
was not, either personally or by publication, and she did not
appear. The Trial Court entered a decree against Gaskins
personally, and ordered the premises closed for one year.
Held.-The decree against Gaskins was error, but is affirmed as to the property. Under the Statute, she may come
in, pay all costs, fees and allowances, and file a bond for the
full value of the property, conditioned that she will immediately abate any nuisance thereon, and prevent it from being
established within one year. Thus she can immediately regain
the use of the property. It is immaterial that Gaskins was not
within the jurisdiction of the Court, and the District Attorney
was not bound to wait until she could be served before proceeding against the tenants and the property.
Judgment Modified and Affirmed.
ABATEMENT OF NUISANCE-JURISDICTION. -

APPEAL AND ERROR-MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.-No. 12,194.

Blackmer vs. Blackmer.-Decided Nov. 12, 1928.
Facts.-The question before the Court was upon a motion
to dismiss the Writ of Error under Rule Eight. Rule provides that the party claiming error must move the Court for
a new trial unless such motion is dispensed with. The judgment below was for temporary alimony, attorney's fees and
court costs, which were issues of fact.
Held.-Issues of Fact heard and determined by the Trial
Court cannot be reviewed in this Court in the absence of a
motion for a new trial or an order dispensing therewith in the
record.
Writ of Error Dismissed.
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EXECUTION-LIEN OF SHERIFF-LEVY.-No. 12,177. -

Jus-

tice, as Sheriff, vs. Hoch.-Decided October 29, 1928.
Facts.-Justice, as sheriff, brought action against Hoch
for two grain drills that the former claimed he had levied
upon, and to which Hoch claimed the title. The grain drills
were in a tin building. The sheriff went to the building and
tacked up a notice of levy on the building. The sheriff did
not remove the grain drills nor was any custodian left in
charge, nor was any lock placed on the door.
Held.-Levy insufficient. A valid levy cannot be made
under a Writ of Execution as against third persons where no
change, either actual or constructive, is wrought in the possession, custody or control of the goods claimed under the levy.
Judgment Affirmed.
GAMBLING DEBTS-NEGOTIABLE

INSTRUMENTS--RATIFICA-

TION.-No. 11,908.-National Surety Co., vs. Stockyards
National Bank.-Decided November 26, 1928.
Facts.-The Surety Company was subrogated to the
rights of its assured, one of whose employes, Decker, was
trusted with signed checks to be filled in for paying his employer's bills under $100.00. The bank knew nothing of this
limitation. Decker gambled and paid his gambling debts
with these checks drawn on the bank. Two or three years
later this suit was started. There was evidence that the bank
might have recovered from Decker, if it had known the facts
at once.
Held.-Sec. 6869, C. L. 1921 is not decisive of this case.
The Surety Company's long delay constitutes a ratification of
the bank's acts in paying the checks.
Judgment Affirmed.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS -

DAMAGES -

INSTRUCTIONS.

No. 12,007.-The City of Ft. Collins vs. Smith.-Decided
October 29, 1928.
Facts.-Mrs. Smith had a verdict and judgment against
the City of Ft. Collins for $11,800.00 for personal injuries sustained in a collision between a streetcar in which she was riding and an engine operated by the Colorado and Southern
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Railroad Company. Objections were entered to instructions
given by the Lower Court and refused by the Lower Court
on the ground of newly discovered evidence.
Held.-Lower Court did not commit error in giving or
refusing the instructions. Newly discovered evidence was
largely cumulative and not sufficient to warrant granting a
new trial.
Judgment Affirmed.
NON-SUIT -

REFUSAL TO TESTIFY -

CONTRIBUTARY NEGLI-

12,011.'Conner & Conner vs. Sullivan.-Decided November 26, 1928.
Facts.-Sullivan was driving his car on a public road,
when the engine suddenly stopped. He got out and went to
the rear of the car to investigate, when he was struck by the
Conners' car and injured. At this trial the Conners' motion
for a non-suit was overruled, and they put on evidence in defense but refused to testify themselves. They now assign error,
based on the overruling of their motion.
Held.-Sec. 1271, C. L. 1921, prohibiting stopping on
public highways, does not apply here, because plaintiff did
not stop voluntarily. The question of contributory negligence
was for the jury. Defendants' failure to testify could well be
taken to be equivalent to making positive admissions. The
former opinion, holding that a defendant, by putting on a defense waives the error of the trial court in denying a non-suit,
is withdrawn.
Judgment Affirmed.
GENCE.-No.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-REAL ESTATE LEASES.-No.

12,191.
-Great Western Finance Company vs. Davis.-Decided
November 5, 1928.
Facts.-GreatWestern Finance Company was the agent
of Stansfield, the owner of a certain house, for the purpose of
renting it. Davis claimed damages for breach of contract to
give the lease of the residence property.
Held.-The owner of the real estate and not the agent is
the party liable. When a real estate agent acting in behalf
of the owner and with authority to do so agrees to lease the
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owner's property, the owner and not the agent is the one that
is bound by the agreement.
Judgment Reversed.
QUIET TITLE-FORECLOSURE.-No. 12,105.-Pope vs. Parker.
-Decided November 5, 1928.
Facts.-Pope made a contract with one Pelz to sell certain land to him. Pelz assigned his interest to Parker. The
contract of sale provided that in case of default Pope would
have a right to enter upon the premises described and sell the
same at public sale to pay the purchase price, accounting to
Pelz for any surplus. Pope's action was to quiet title.
Held.-Contract was nothing but a mortgage. The provision for entry and sale was void. The court below should
have defeated it as a foreclosure and not as an action to quiet
title and should have given relief as in foreclosure cases.
Judgment Reversed with Directions.
QUIET TITLE-FORECLOSURE.-No. 11,975. - Pioneer State
Bank vs. Herron.-DecidedNovember 5, 1928.
Facts.-Herron obtained a judgment quieting title as
against the claims of the Pioneer State Bank. In 1917 Georgia
A. Strelow, the owner of real estate, executed a promissory
note and secured the payment by a trust deed. The Pioneer
State Bank acquired the note. Georgia A. Strelow died leaving as her sole heirs, her husband and four children, one of
them being the Plaintiff. The bank foreclosed on the mortgage but neglected to make the children parties to the suit.
Held.-The foreclosure decree in sale were valid as to
the husband's interests, but not as to the children's interests,
because they were not parties to the action, nor were they before the Court; notwithstanding the fact that the bank bid the
full amount of the mortgage debt at the sale, all it acquired
was the husband's interest in the property, and the Court below instead of quieting the title should have entered a decree
that the bank's trust deed was still a lien upon the children's
interest in the lots to the extent of one-half of the trust deed
indebtedness.
Judgment Reversed with Directions.
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TAXATION -

GASOLINE TAx -

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.-

No. 12,019.-State of Colorado vs. City & County of Denver.-Decided November 26, 1928.
Facts.-The State brought suit against the City, alleging
five causes of action, under various state statutes imposing
taxes on the sale of petroleum products:
1. For the recovery of two cents per gallon of gasoline
under the Act of 1919, as amended;
2. For the recovery of one mill per gallon of gasoline
inspection tax, under the Act of 1915;
3. For the recovery of three cents per gallon of gasoline,
under the Act of 1927;
4. For the recovery of three cents per gallon of gasoline
used by the Denver Board of Water Commissioners since the
passage of the Act of 1927;
5. For the recovery of oil inspection fees since the passage of the Act of 1927.
Held.-I. The Act of 1919 amended is not broad enough
to include cities, either specifically or by necessary implication, and it therefore does not apply to them;
2. The City should pay the inspection fee on gasoline.
This is a measure, not for revenue, but for public protection;
3 and 4. The City's claim of exemption under Article X,
Sec. 4 of the Colorado Constitution is unsound, because the tax
imposed by the Act of 1927 is an excise tax, not a property tax.
5. The oil inspection tax was established by Sec. 3623,
C. L. 1921. This was expressly repealed by the Act of 1927,
and no substitute for it was provided. The City is, therefore,
not liable for this tax since 1927.
Judgment Reversed.
WARRANTY DEEDS-AFTER-ACQUIRED TITLE-REFORMATION.

-No. 12,070.-Trout Fisheries vs. Wellenberg.-Decided
November 26, 1928.
Facts.-Welfenberg owned a tract of land which he conveyed to the Fisheries by warranty deed. He also included in
the deed an adjoining two acre tract which he did not then
own, but which he later acquired, mortgaged and sold. The
Fisheries, claiming after-acquired title, brought this suit to
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cancel the mortgage and subsequent deed executed by Welf enberg, who alleged that the two acre tract was included in the
first deed through mistake of both parties, and prayed for a
reformation of this deed, which was awarded by the trial court.
Held.-The Fisheries' contention, (1) that Welfenberg
did not plead mutual mistake, and (2) that the evidence does
not justify reformation, cannot be sustained.
Judgment Affirmed.
WATER RIGHTS PRACTICE.-No.

11,954.-The San Luis Val-

ley IrrigatingDistrict, et al., vs. The Centennial Irrigating
Ditch Company.-Decided October 29, 1928.
Facts.-The Ditch Company petitioned for a change of
the point of diversion in its irrigation system. It published
notice of the proceeding, and assumed to obtain service by
publication rather than personal service. This was its fourth
attempt to change point of diversion, and the matter had been
previously passed upon by the Supreme Court.
Held.-(1) The petition should have been dismissed as
this was a clear attempt to re-litigate a matter previously determined. (2) Water right proceedings are subject to the provisions of the Code and must be prosecuted in accordance with
such provisions and service must be had as in the service of
summons in other civil cases.
Judgment Reversed with Directions.
CONSTRUCTION - LAPSED LEGACY.-No. 12,129.Gibson & Stevenson vs. Hills as Executor.-Decided November 26, 1928.
Facts.-Hills,as Executor of Harriet Hauser's will, filed
a petition for construction of the will. Gibson and Stevenson
answered, claiming the residue of the estate. The will gave
testatrix' sister $500.00, but if she died before testatrix, this
gift was to go to Gibson and Stevenson, the sister's daughters.
The residue of the estate was left simply to the testatrix' sister,
whose daughters now allege that the will is ambiguous, and
that the County Court should have admitted evidence of the
close relations between testatrix and their mother.
Held.-The will is not ambiguous in any way, and the
WILLS -
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residuary legacy, having lapsed, went to the heirs as in cases
of intestacy, under Sec. 5271, C. L. 1921.
Judgment Affirmed.
WITNESSES-DECEASED PARTY.-No. 12,004.-Haffner, vs.

Van Blarcom and Marsh as Trustees under the Last Will,
etc., of Mary L. Haffner, deceased, and Henry Gianella.
Facts.-Haffnerand the defendant Gianella entered into
a written contract for the development of certain mining property. Under the contract both advanced certain money. Title
to the property was taken in the name of Haffner, and there
were certain outstanding tax sale certificates which he acquired and caused the assignments thereof to be made to one
Marion Patton Scott, who afterwards became his wife. Haffner then conveyed an undivided one-half interest in the property to the defendant Gianella. Marion Patton Scott died
without having assigned her interest in the property back to
Haffner. Haffner sues the trustees of Marion Patton Scott
for the interest acquired under the tax deeds issued under the
tax certificates, and the defendant Gianella for an accounting
as partner. At the trial of the case Haffner offered himself as
a witness in his own behalf. The defendants objected under
the provisions of Section 6556 of C. L. 1921.
Held.-The testimony offered by Haffner was clearly
competent upon the issues between him and defendant Gianella, as the section of the statute referred to could not possibly bar his testimony in so far as Gianella was concerned.
Reversed-but on rehearing remanded for new trial as to
defendant Gianella and otherwise Affirmed.
WORK AND LABOR-DEPUTY WATER COMMISSIONER-STATU-

TORY ACCOUNT.-No. 12,034.-Board of County Commissioners vs. Ellis.-Decided November 19, 1928.
Facts.-Ellis sued the Board for compensation for services alleged to have been performed in October and November, 1923. The Board offered evidence to show that the ditches
under Ellis' supervision were in good condition and that there
was no need for his services. This offer was refused by the
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trial Court. The Board also objected to the form of bill.
Judgment was directed for plaintiff.
Held.-The evidence offered by the Board was material
and should have been received. The bill presented by Ellis
was not in statutory form and the objection to it should have
been sustained.
Judgment Reversed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-RE-MARRIAGE OF BENEFICIARY.

-No. 12,159.-Ruth G. Tavenor, (now Mrs. Thomas E.
Fisher), vs. Royal Indemnity Company, et al.-Decided
October 29, 1928.
Facts.-The plaintiff received an award at a hearing before the Industrial Commission. The defendants paid some of
the payments provided for by the award. Later the plaintiff
claimant was married, and a short time thereafter applied for
a lump sum settlement under the terms of Section 55 of the
Act of 1919, which lump sum settlement was allowed. Defendants contended that Section 55 did not apply, but that
Section 82 was a proper section upon which to proceed. The
commission allowed said lump sum settlement, and expressly
granted it under the terms of Section 55, and not under Section 58, which provided among other things that the benefits
shall terminate upon marriage of beneficiary.
Held.-That Section 58 being later in time must have by
implication repealed Section 55 as the two could not be reconciled, Section 55 allowing lump sum payments after the
marriage of the beneficiary and Section 58 expressly providing that they should cease upon marriage of the beneficiary.
Judgment Affirmed.
STAY - No. 12, 229. - The
John Thompson Grocery Company vs. Industrial Commission.-DecidedNovember 12, 1928.
Facts.-The Commission allowed compensation, temporary and permanent, to one Healy. The temporary was paid
and the insurance carrier contested the permanent. Plaintiff
in Error asks for a stay until the decision here. It appears that
Healy, the injured person, is now at work.
WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION -
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Held.-In case of one at work and not in immediate need,
denial of a stay and consequent payment of the full amount
will, in case of a reversal, defeat the Writ of Error and in the
present case stay should be allowed.
Stay Ordered.

RECENT TRIAL COURT DECISIONS
(EDITOR'S No'm.-Jt is intended in each issue of Dicta to note any interesting decisions of the United States District Court, the Denver District Court, the County
Court, the Juvenile Court, and occasionally the Justice Courts.)

CORPORATIONS-SEWERS---BASIS
OF
ASSESSMENTS-DENVER DISTRICT COURT-No. 101392, Division

MUNICIPAL

2-Santa Fe Land Improvement Company vs. DenverJames C. Starkweather, Judge.
Facts.-Plaintiffsues to enjoin assessment for sewer costs,
claiming its property was already served by a sewer and not
benefitted by the new one. The Council, sitting as a Board of
Equalization, had refused to hear plaintiff, on the grounds it
had no right to change the cost apportionment. Defendant
demurred.
Held.-Sec. 20 of the Charter provides City may make
improvements and "assess the cost * * * upon the property

especially benefitted * * ", but Sec. 60 provides, "The cost of
district sewers shall be assessed * * * in proportion as the area
of each piece of real estate in the district is to the area of all
the real estate in the district * * *",

and makes the basis area,

not benefit. The Council's decision that the improvement
was reasonable and beneficial to the territory as a whole, was
a legislative act and final, and justified the creation of the
district, irrespective of individual benefits.
DemurrerSustained.
ANNULMENT-FRAUD. -

DENVER JUVENILE COURT.

-

No.

6338.-Sides vs. Sides.-Robert W. Steele, Judge.
Facts.-Action to annul marriage on ground that said
marriage was procured by fraudulent representations. Among
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these representations were: that defendant could and would
establish a home where he and plaintiff would live alone; that
defendant did not use intoxicating liquor. At the date of marriage plaintiff was fourteen years of age. Plaintiff and defendant cohabited for seven days, then parted. The evidence
was that defendant refused to provide a separate abode, and
that he was financially unable so to do; also, that defendant
became intoxicated.
Held.-To constitute such fraud as will support an annulment in a case where the marriage has been consummated by
cohabitation, it is not sufficient that the misrepresentations relate to accidental matters, such as rank, fame, fortune, habits,
or temperament; it is sufficient when the fraud relates to matters necessarily affecting the health or well being of the parties
or any offspring. The youth of the plaintiff is immaterial if
the misrepresentations do not relate to essential matters. In
the present case, the misrepresentations do not go to the essence of the marriage contract.
Petition Dismissed.

HOLLAND'S LEGISLATIVE SERVICE
27th Session, 1929

Experienced

Dependable

COPIES OF EACH ACT DELIVERED AS SOON AS APPROVED

COMPLETE INDEX - LOOSE-LEAF BINDERS
Reduced Price $10.00
ADDRESS: 214 STATE HOUSE

-da

LEGALSTENOGRAPHER?
all Main. 6505

Business , en's

•21 3 ,wUdland Savings Building .Derr

•

deari
ouse

